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The final chapter of Spinoza’s Ethics has elicited numerous interpretations, and in this work, 
I discuss Jonathan Bennett’s and Harry Wolfson’s.  Bennett claims that the doctrine of blessedness is 
unintelligible, while Wolfson claims that Spinoza’s account of blessedness actually defends 
traditional, medieval views of the immortality of the soul.  I find neither of these acceptable accounts 
for the reasons presented below, and I have a simple alternative explanation for this doctrine.  
Essentially, I argue that by ‘blessedness’ Spinoza means being happy with being virtuous.  In my 
reading of the Ethics, Spinoza first offers the account that we should help others in order to help 
ourselves, and then he explains that we should enjoy doing so, and he writes that being happy with 
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In the Ethics, Spinoza presents an argument for what he considers to be the highest satisfaction or 
good a person could attain.  This subject does not receive very much attention in Spinoza scholarship; 
indeed, a search on the philosopher’s index returned very few leads.  This work will address the 
thoughts of two Spinoza scholars, Wolfson and Bennett, on the matter.  Wolfson is entirely 
sympathetic to the doctrine of blessedness but he also interprets it as a doctrine of personal 
immortality in defense of traditional medieval views.  This is problematic even on a superficial level 
because that interpretation does not accord with Spinoza’s many rejections of doctrines of personal 
immortality, and it will be shown that Spinoza’s metaphysical system simply does not support a 
doctrine of personal immortality.  On the other hand, Bennett is entirely unsympathetic to the doctrine 
of blessedness, and he finds it completely unintelligible.  However, I do offer an alternative 
interpretation, which claims that Spinoza’s account of “blessedness” describes a state of satisfaction 
with one’s own virtue, a love of virtue rather than vices; indeed, it is at best only an episodic state 
because no human being is capable of being forever virtuous, and will be acted on in Spinoza’s 
language. 
Of the two authors I have engaged with on the subject of Spinoza’s account of blessedness, I am 
more sympathetic to Wolfson’s interpretation.  Indeed, I feel that he was steered off course in his 
interpretation of blessedness by his attempt to force Spinoza into the mould of a traditionalist who 
believes in an afterlife.  Instead, I view Spinoza as a man who was continually confronted by the 
people of his time, who were largely ignorant of the discernable regularities that most of us now 
know actually do govern the world, and that these people committed horrible atrocities because of 
their ignorance.  While the Ethics is full of speculative metaphysical ideas, it is about conduct first 
and foremost; otherwise, it would have another title.  Indeed, Spinoza’s biography shows that he had 




community had felt the religious persecution of the time, as he rightly says, “The mob is terrifying, if 
unafraid.”1
This thesis asks whether or not the doctrine of “blessedness”  and the last half of part five in 
general are consistent with what came before in the Ethics.  I first engage with Bennett who reacts too 
harshly to Spinoza’s final doctrines, and calls them inconsistent when he should not.  The chapter 
devoted to Bennett addresses his concerns about “blessedness” by considering his objection to the 
third kind of knowledge and the love of God.  While his objection to the eternity of the mind is also 
unfounded, I have omitted it from this work because I feel that my responses to his objections to the 
  Indeed, we can only look back on this one and other periods of religious persecution and 
shudder at what human beings are capable of doing when they carry hateful beliefs, and I feel that 
Spinoza’s Ethics contains his best attempt at an antidote to the violence caused by ignorance.  In it, he 
writes that cooperation is humanity’s best means to achieve individual self-preservation, and this 
could hardly be further from the accepted beliefs of his time. 
I imagine that reading Spinoza’s Ethics for the first time is a strange thing for anyone, and will only 
be stranger for future generations, as we learn more through the sciences.  Spinoza’s concept of 
thinking substance is so foreign to us today, yet he used this as a way to explain how one can have 
ideas, and it works insofar as he is able to show that God, or substance, lacks a will and that the ideas 
a person has come from previous experience.  However, Spinoza’s system is not perfect; indeed, how 
could it be when the details are different from what we now know of reality?  Nevertheless, the more 
often I have read the Ethics, the more respect I have for what Spinoza was trying to do with the 
knowledge available to him in his time, and the more I wonder what Spinoza might have said if he 
lived today. 





third kind of knowledge and the love of God are enough to show that “blessedness” is intelligible in 
Spinoza’s work.   
In the chapter concerning Wolfson, I focus on his interpretation of the doctrine of the eternity of the 
mind for the reason that Wolfson views the eternal part of the mind as an immortal part, and argues 
that Spinoza calls this immortality “blessedness”, which we can have intimations of during our lives.  
Hence, in order to reject Wolfson’s interpretation of “blessedness,” I must reject his account of the 
eternity of the mind.  Indeed, by doing so I feel that I have adequately discussed the matter of the 
eternity of the mind as it pertains to my interpretation of “blessedness.” 
I would like to offer a brief version of my account of “blessedness” here.  Spinoza claims that 
cooperation rather than competition leads to an increased ability to strive, and that this is what each 
individual person should want to do.  When we consider this alongside the final proposition in the 
Ethics, we can begin to see how Spinoza’s emphasis on blessedness as the enjoyment of virtue itself 
connects to his overall system.  That is, by claiming that striving to persevere in being is a person’s 
real interest, Spinoza sets the stage for giving his readers reasons to want to be virtuous.  Then, it is 
easy to see how he would call enjoying what he calls the best means to persevere in being “blessed.”  
The reason I call this an episodic account is because Spinoza’s account does not really permit a 
person to be virtuous all of the time, nor does it allow a person to always actually persevere in being.  
It does not allow a person to always ‘act’ but it expects that a person will be acted on, and it is for this 






The Ten Uses of the Root “Beat” in the Ethics 
 
Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” (beatudio) or “blessed” (beat) in only ten different places in the 
entire Ethics.  In this chapter, I discuss the ten different locations the Latin root “beat” is applied in 
the Ethics, and I offer a brief interpretation of how these uses pertain to my argument.   
The first time Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the preface to the second book of the 
Ethics, Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Spinoza promises to explain “those things which must 
necessarily follow from the essence of God, [… and] that can lead us, by the hand, as it were, to the 
knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.” 
The second book details a great deal of Spinoza’s account of ideas, but also about the physical 
regularities evident in the world.  He does not mention “blessedness” directly again until the scholium 
to the final proposition in this book.  However, I would like to suggest that his treatment of ideas and 
of the world is pivotal to the doctrine of “blessedness” since the third kind of knowledge Spinoza 
makes so much of in the final book of the Ethics deals with the matter of adequate and inadequate 
ideas directly.  To put things on a practical level, Spinoza’s treatment of the third kind of knowledge 
is his way of explaining how one can trust that the regularities evident in the world actually are 
eternal regularities. 
The second place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” it is in the fourth scholium to the corollary 
of the final proposition of the second book.  I have reproduced it at length near the end of chapter 
three and I do not want to cite it here.  However, the relevant section pertains to social life and the 




complicated one and I do not have the space to defend my thoughts here.  However, I would like to 
offer an explanation of how this instance of the use of the word “blessedness” accords with my 
interpretation of “blessedness” as satisfaction with one’s own virtue.  Arguably, Spinoza writes that 
the ideas other people hold come from their experiences, and they are not free to hold different ideas 
unless they have been accordingly influenced.  Hence, if some people have lived poor, desperate lives 
because of oppressive conditions, then they will act in ways to persevere in their own being that 
might be dangerous to you.  Thus, as a part of your own struggle to persevere, you would be remiss 
not to raise the standard of living of your fellow man so that he does not act against your interest from 
the trappings of poverty. 
The third place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in IVP21, and in the scholium.  Here, 
Spinoza writes that a desire to be “blessed” entails a desire to live.  I find this consistent with 
Spinoza’s claims in IIP7 and in other places as well, which states that self-preservation is the essence 
of singular things.  Hence, it seems entirely consistent for Spinoza to then call a desire for self-
preservation a person’s highest satisfaction. 
The fourth place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the scholium to IVP54, wherein he 
explains that repentance is actually a bad thing for an individual because it entails a loss of power.  
However, it is also a good thing for that individual because it inhibits the unacceptable behaviour in 
people who do not live from the dictates of reason, and could not one day enjoy the life of the 
“blessed” if they gave in to all of their base desires.  In an uncharacteristically manipulative tone, 
Spinoza thinks that these people might one day come to love virtue more than vice, and the first step 
they must take is to feel bad about their vices. 
The fifth place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the fourth section of the appendix to the 




knowledge through reason as the highest satisfaction of the mind, and that “blessedness” lies therein.  
I have a great deal to say about this passage, but I use this information as a part of the argument 
against Bennett’s failure to appreciate the benefits of the third kind of knowledge.  Perhaps it will do 
here to say that Spinoza’s endorsement of knowledge of the third kind is an endorsement of learning 
the best means by which to strive to persevere, because one gains adequate knowledge of the formal 
essences2
The sixth place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the preface to the fifth part, wherein 
Spinoza treats “the power of reason, showing what it can do against the affects, and what freedom of 
the mind, or blessedness is.”
 of the attributes.  This knowledge is proof that God lacks a will, and that the essences of the 
attributes are eternal.  Thus, one can at least be certain that the regularities one observes in reality are 
here to stay. 
3  Clearly, this is a remark that further shows the extent to which Spinoza 
had “blessedness” in mind when he discusses reason and ideas, for he now promises to explain how 
this knowledge leads to blessedness.  Indeed, in the preface to the third part, Spinoza writes that he 
will “consider human actions and appetites as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.”4
The seventh place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the scholium to VP31.  The 
proposition endorses the third kind of knowledge, which I have already promised to discuss at length 
in a later chapter.  The specific use of the word is found in the scholium, where Spinoza writes, 
“…the more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of knowledge, the more conscious of himself 
  
Now, Spinoza wants us to apply the power of reason to our minds in order to alter our behaviour and 
achieve “blessedness,” or to learn how to like being virtuous out of our own interest in self-
preservation. 
                                                   





and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed he is.”5
The eighth place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is found in the scholium of VP33.  This is 
the place where Spinoza writes, “If joy, then, consists in a passage to a greater perfection, blessedness 
must surely consist in the fact that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.”
  Since Spinoza comes to endorse virtue as 
the best means of striving, then the more knowledge one acquires of the third kind, then the more one 
knows about the essence of the attributes of substance and of oneself, since each person is a mode.  
This knowledge should then lead to virtuous action, in Spinoza’s account. 
6
Spinoza’s explicit statement that “blessedness” is rightly called the satisfaction of mind accords with 
my interpretation of a satisfaction with one’s own virtue.  The fact that Spinoza calls this the glory in 
  The connection 
between joy and the passage to a greater perfection is something I discuss at length in the third 
chapter of this work.  Here, it should suffice to say that “blessedness” is the feeling that accompanies 
virtue, and it only comes about because the mind actually holds adequate ideas; otherwise, the mind 
could hold inadequate ideas but one could still persevere.  In that case, one would not be “blessed” 
because one does not achieve the satisfaction with one’s virtue. 
The ninth place Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” is in the scholium to VP36.  This is the 
proposition where Spinoza equates the intellectual love of God with the love with which God loves 
himself.  In the scholium to the corollary to this proposition, Spinoza writes,  
…our salvation or blessedness or freedom consists … in a constant 
and eternal love of God…And this love, or blessedness is called 
glory in the sacred scriptures – not without reason.  For whether this 
love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called 
satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from glory.  







the sacred scriptures sends Wolfson on quite a lengthy search in his book in order to find the passage 
to which he thinks Spinoza referred. We need not worry about that here since Wolfson’s criteria for 
selecting one passage over another seem somewhat arbitrary.7
                                                   
7 CF. Wolfson, 313-316 
 
The final place Spinoza used the word “blessedness” is, of course, in the final proposition of the 
Ethics.  This is where Spinoza pulls all of his ideas together and states that “blessedness” is virtue 
itself, and not the reward of virtue, which accords with my interpretation of “blessedness” as a 
satisfaction with virtue.  In addition, “blessedness” is the love of God, which arises from the third 
kind of knowledge, and this accords with my interpretation of the ninth use of the word 
“blessedness.”  Moreover, Spinoza’s point that one is able to restrain one’s lusts because one enjoys 
blessedness is in accord with my interpretation of the sixth use of the word, when Spinoza discussed 
the power reason has over the affects. 
This section was not an argument on its own, but I offer it as a catalogue of the instances where 
Spinoza used the word “blessedness” in the Ethics.  Indeed, my own account does not come until 












Bennett on Blessedness 
Bennett writes, “the final one-twentieth of the work, from VP23 to the end, contains a failure, … an 
unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster.  I would like to excuse myself from discussing it, 
but my adverse judgment on it should be defended.”8  In addition, he writes, “after three centuries of 
failure to profit from it, the time has come to admit that this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us 
and it is pretty certainly worthless.”9  Moreover, Bennett goes so far as to say, “Those of us who love 
and admire Spinoza’s philosophical work should in sad silence avert our eyes from the second half of 
Part V.”10
                                                   
8 Bennett 357 
9 Bennett 372 
10 Bennett 375 
 
While Bennett finds the doctrine of “blessedness” inconsistent with the remainder of Spinoza’s 
system, this thesis will argue that it actually is entirely consistent with the philosophical framework 
Spinoza created in the Ethics, and this allows us to understand the ethical project Spinoza had in 
mind.  It is in the final section of the Ethics that Spinoza clearly states the way in which the love of 
God (which is virtue by another name) influences daily, practical conduct.  That is, it is through 
satisfaction with virtue, which is the best means of striving to persevere in being, that one attains 
“blessedness.”  This chapter will first explain the details of Bennett’s claims that “blessedness” is 




2.1 Bennett’s Main Objections 
It is somewhat difficult to address Bennett’s concerns about “blessedness” for two reasons.  The first 
is that he does not give Spinoza a very charitable interpretation; secondly, Bennett spends so little 
time discussing “blessedness,” or, indeed, any of the three associated doctrines that it is difficult to 
see his reasons for claiming that the final four doctrines are unintelligible.  Nevertheless, Bennett’s 
claim that “blessedness” is inconsistent with Spinoza’s framework must be addressed here in order 
for my claim, that “blessedness” actually is consistent, to be heard, because he is an absolutely 
canonical Spinoza scholar and he is the harshest critic of the doctrine of blessedness.  This work 
focuses on the doctrine of blessedness, and since the three final doctrines do all pertain to 
blessedness, it is prudent to address Bennett’s concerns about these doctrines.  However, Bennett has 
such an overtly hostile tone toward the final section of the Ethics that it is difficult to be charitable to 
him.  For example, Bennett remarks that Pollock is the only commentator of Spinoza who views the 
final stretch of the Ethics as intelligible whose work Bennett actually respects.  Bennett cites 
Pollock’s words that the eternity of the mind “throws a sort of poetical glow over the formality of 
[Spinoza’s] exposition.”11  In response to this, Bennett writes that Pollock is “reduced to such 
babbling by his desire to praise the final stretch of the Ethics, [and] that is further evidence that this 
material is valueless.  Worse, it is dangerous: it is rubbish that causes others to write rubbish.”12
Indeed, Bennett finds himself at a loss to explain why Spinoza would include the final doctrines, 
and he even speculates that “…he was after all terrified of extinction and convinced himself – through 
a scatter of perverse arguments and hunger for the conclusion – that he had earned immortality … it 
looks as though some passive affect – of fear or hope or excitement – clung stubbornly to the man and 
   
                                                   
11 Bennett 374 





2.2 Blessedness and Part IV 
  It is of course acceptable to critique Spinoza’s conclusions about 
blessedness.  However, it should not be acceptable to dismiss the doctrine outright as unintelligible on 
unfounded grounds. 
Bennett writes that Spinoza does not work hard enough to connect “blessedness” with Part IV in a 
coherent moral doctrine, and that the only time Spinoza actually connects the ideas of “blessedness” 
to the ideas from Part IV is in the final scholium of the book.14
Bennett is puzzled by Spinoza’s characterization of the ignorant man, who “…as soon as he ceases 
to be acted on he ceases to be.”
   
Bennett is simply wrong to say that the only place Spinoza connects the doctrines of part five with 
part four is in the final scholium.  Indeed, numerous references throughout the propositions of part 
five draw connections to propositions and axioms from part four.  It is difficult to follow Bennett’s 
claims in this regard.   
15  Bennett’s puzzlement soon turns to undue criticism, for he writes, 
“he [Spinoza] is now writing in so lax and slippery a fashion as to defeat reasonable conjecture about 
his meaning.”16  Truthfully, I am somewhat puzzled by this claim as well, and have been puzzled by 
Spinoza’s occasional statements that some things have more reality than others do.17
                                                   
13 Bennett 375 
14 cf 371 
15 VP42Schol. 
16 Bennett 372 
17 cf E IIP13CS; IVPreface 
  However, I 
would like to offer an interpretation of Spinoza’s statement.  I do believe that the Ethics has an 
undertone suggesting that the virtuous person is more real than someone who lacks virtue; however, 




address this curious aspect of Spinoza’s Ethics entirely.  However, a brief version is useful here, at 
least as an attempt to show that Bennett is being unduly harsh to Spinoza.   
Consider IVD8, which suggests that virtue is “the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as he has 
the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature 
alone.”18  We should also consider that the ignorant man lacks knowledge that virtue is his best means 
of striving, which is evident from IVP22.  Hence, we should think that the ignorant man would lack 
the essence of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about things that can be understood 
through the laws of his nature alone.  It is also useful to consider IVP21 on this matter, which states, 
“No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, unless at the same time he desires to be, 
to act and to live, that is, to actually exist.”19
                                                   
18 IVD8 
19 IVP21 
  Thus, since the ignorant man lacks virtue, he can only 
bring things about that cannot be understood through his nature alone, in other words he can only 
bring things about inadequately.  Indeed, his lack of virtue and his inability to act go together; hence, 
when he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be a cause of things that can be understood through his 
nature.  Perhaps this goes some way toward explaining how Spinoza can say that the ignorant man 
ceases to be when he ceases to be acted on, though what Spinoza has in mind is not entirely clear to 
me.  Perhaps Spinoza is somewhat incautious by using the phrase ‘ceases to be,’ however, Bennett is 
inexplicably uncharitable in this section, and his inability to see the connections between parts five 
and four is startling.  What is clear from this discussion is that Spinoza’s final proposition, the one 
Bennett objects to, does have connections to the system Spinoza worked out in the preceding sections 




2.3 Bennett on the Third Kind of Knowledge and The Intellectual Love of God 
The following two subsections will consider Bennett’s thoughts on the third kind of knowledge and 
the intellectual love of God, since these two are more closely related to virtue than to the eternity of 
the mind.  Indeed, Spinoza writes that even if we have no knowledge of the eternity of our mind we 
would still pursue virtue, tenacity and nobility, which pertains directly to “blessedness.”  
2.3.1 Bennett on the Third Kind of Knowledge  
In explaining how he understands the intellectual love of God, Bennett misses a part of Spinoza’s 
argument.  Spinoza writes that we come to know God by the third kind of knowledge, or intuition, 
and this is different from the second kind, reason; Bennett has difficulty understanding why the third 
kind of knowledge is different from the second kind.  Bennett’s error comes from his failure to 
appreciate the difference between having knowledge of a singular thing and knowledge of a singular 
thing’s essence.  Bennett writes that Spinoza does not “…explain how the proposition that all things 
depend on God is to be inferred from the very essence of any particular thing which we say depends 
on God.”20
The connection Bennett does not seem to be able to make is that adequate knowledge of the formal 
essence of things is more than just adequate knowledge of singular things. In introducing the third 
kind of knowledge, Spinoza writes, “…this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the 
formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the formal essence of 
things.”
  Hence, Bennett does not understand what Spinoza means by the third kind of knowledge.   
21  Surely, this is something different from the second kind of knowledge, which consists of 
“…adequate ideas of the properties of things.”22
                                                   
20 Bennett 369. 
21 IIP40Schol2 
22 IIP40Schol2 




makes is that if one understands the formal essence of an attribute, one will also be able to understand 
the formal essence of any mode of that attribute.  Hence, it gives a greater knowledge of substance, 
and the second kind of knowledge can lead to this.  Indeed, if we consider IIP44C2 we can see that “it 
is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity.”  Hence, we could 
have adequate knowledge of a thing’s formal essence through the second kind of knowledge by 
understanding that the formal essence of the singular thing has a kind of existence that cannot be 
expressed in terms of duration.  It is by encountering singular things and conceiving of them in this 
way that one might then arrive at knowledge of the third kind, which pertains to the eternal nature of 
the attributes, of which the singular things are modes. 
The real difference is that a person with adequate knowledge only of the properties of things will 
not also know that all things are necessarily conceived through God (or the one and only substance).  
Hence, that person who only understands things by the second kind of knowledge would not be able 
to say with certainty that the same rules of cause and effect that are observed in this or that mode of 
an attribute are a part of God’s perfection, and it is crucial to note that difference.  Consider that if 
one did not know that God was perfect, then one might be inclined to think that the benefits or 
hardships of one’s life were things that God ‘went out of his way to cause’ and were not events that 
simply follow from previous causes without any will on God’s part.  Having adequate knowledge of a 
thing would mean having a complete account of the causes of that brought the thing into its current 
state, and this is impossible to have, and this is not a part of the third kind of knowledge.  Instead, 
having adequate knowledge of the formal essence of a thing involves knowledge of the essence of the 




that one can actually have adequate knowledge of the formal essence of a thing, and this comes from 
considering it under a species of eternity, which I will discuss later.23
The counter argument I have presented here avoids certain problems Bennett sees with Spinoza’s 
account of the third kind of knowledge.  Essentially, Bennett writes that we cannot have adequate 
knowledge of the essence of things, “For intuitive knowledge deals only in adequate ideas, and an 
idea of the whole nature of a real thing could not be adequate in my mind i.e., caused wholly from 
within, unless my body contained the thing in question or a perfect duplicate of it.”
 
24
As noted above, the third kind of knowledge pertains to adequate knowledge of the formal essence 
of attributes, and extends this to knowledge of the formal essence of singular things, which we get by 
encountering singular things.  Bennett is correct to cite IIP37 in support of his claim that we cannot 
have adequate knowledge of a singular thing’s actual essence simply by knowing what is equally in 
the part and in the whole.  However, this is not what Spinoza is saying in his discussion of the third 
kind of knowledge; Spinoza simply says that we do know that the essence of all things is a striving to 
persevere in being.  It is for this reason that I am unsure why Bennett even makes the claim that we 
cannot have adequate knowledge of the actual essence of singular things – Spinoza comes out and 
says what he thinks the actual essence of singular things is.  However, the third kind of knowledge is 
not about knowing the singular thing’s actual essence, but its formal essence.  For an illustration of 
  Certainly, 
Spinoza did not envision anyone’s bodies having perfect duplicates of things as a valid precondition 
for adequate knowledge of a singular thing’s essence, and I think Bennett’s claims about this come 
from his failure to appreciate the difference between a singular thing’s actual essence and its formal 
essence.   
                                                   
23 CF Wolfson 292 




the difference between the actual essence of a singular thing and the formal essence of a thing please 
first consider IIP15, which states, “The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is 
not simple, but composed of a great many ideas…the idea of the body is composed of the many ideas 
of the parts composing the body.”25  This means that a body is made up of other singular things, or 
smaller parts, and the formal idea of the body is also composed of the ideas of each of these smaller 
parts.26  Then, please consider “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is 
nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”27
Perhaps a brief example would be useful: consider that a plant is composed of numerous physical 
structures, each of which seems to obey the regularity that it tries to keep itself together; however, 
understanding how cell walls function and why they fail over time does not give one the whole story 
of the plant, as this knowledge is.  What this knowledge does give, though, is an example of chemical 
and physical regularities that do hold true in plants as well as other organisms.  The knowledge we 
gain from our study of plants can be applied to other instances, and if we use this knowledge to help 
  Clearly, for Spinoza, the actual essence of each thing 
that constitutes the formal thing has this striving, but so too does the singular thing.  Still, knowing 
the actual essence of a singular thing is not the same as having adequate knowledge of the singular 
thing, and we cannot have adequate knowledge of a singular thing but we also do not need it.  If we 
use a human as our example of a singular thing, then it would not be possible to have adequate 
knowledge of that person because he or she might well have inadequate ideas, and be acted on in a 
way that is unpredictable to an observer.  The third kind of knowledge is not about needing adequate 
knowledge about singular things; what we do need in order to be able to strive is knowledge of the 
attributes, and the formal essences of the attributes. 
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us to persevere, then Spinoza would say it would bring us joy.  Conversely, having almost total 
knowledge of the forces that have ever acted on this or that plant does not bring us very useful 
information unless we understand it under a species of eternity, and in terms of its formal essence as 
being just another mode of substance, which adheres to the immutable regularities of the attributes;28
2.3.2 Bennett on the Intellectual Love of God 
 
otherwise, we would be unable to transfer the information observed in this instance to another plant, 
or to another instance.  Hence, Spinoza’s metaphysics endorses the scientific approach of using model 
organisms to observe biochemical processes that occur in a variety of organisms, in the hope that 
knowledge gained from a model organism will be transferable to other organisms, not because they 
have the very same actual essence, but because they are both modes of substance, and are intelligible 
under the very same attribute. 
Bennett writes that a positive account of why the intellectual love of God comes from our 
understanding of God as eternal rather than as what we imagine to be present to us would “…require 
a real understanding of what intuitive knowledge is.”29
Spinoza writes, “Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in, and 
our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.”
  Given the account presented above, we can 
now give the positive account Bennett was missing. 
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however, the reader who wishes to engage further with this material is advised to consider Edwin Curley’s 
“Behind the Geometrical Method,” particularly beginning on page 23. 
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  Here, Spinoza writes that when we 
understand the eternal or immutable nature of the attributes we experience pleasure that is 




case.  Given that Spinoza thinks that all things strive to persevere, and that pleasure accompanies an 
increase in one’s ability to strive, knowing that substance has immutable or eternal attributes is a huge 
boon.  Consider the opposite for a moment; indeed, if the attributes of substance did not express 
eternal or immutable regularities, and these regularities were not comprehensible, then we would not 
be able to strive well at all.  Try to imagine the chaos that would happen if the normal regularities did 
not exist, and we were, for example, able to drink water to quench our thirst one day, but be unable to 
do so the next because water suddenly disappeared from the planet.  On its surface, this is an 
outlandish example, but it is not so different from what Spinoza is actually trying to rule out with the 
second and third kinds of knowledge.  However, this still does not suggest that human beings could 
completely understand all of the antecedent causes that brought about this or that event because they 
regress infinitely; moreover, there are also cases where the regularities themselves are too complex to 
grasp.  Simply put, however, the normal, everyday regularities necessary for survival are absolutely 
comprehensible parts of the eternal attributes, and understanding that they hold true from one point in 
time to another is a source of “power” because holding this knowledge increases one’s ability to 
strive to persevere. 
It is knowledge of the third kind, of the formal essences of the attributes and therefore of the formal 
essences of all modes as well that allows us to strive well.  In other words, knowledge of the third 
kind shows us that the eternal essence of the attributes applies, and this lets us know how to strive to 
persevere in all places, because certain regularities always hold.  This is the backbone Spinoza needs 
for his ethical system to endorse virtue, and it is for this reason that Spinoza writes, in the corollary to 




insofar as we understand God to be eternal.  And this is what I call the intellectual love of God.”31  
Thus, when Spinoza discusses the intellectual love of God, he does not mean us to imagine this or 
that part of substance that is before us, and how it might be behaving; instead, he means for us to 
understand the eternal nature of the attributes, and recognize their usefulness to us.  It is worth noting 
that Bennett explicitly calls Spinoza’s statements in VP32 “lame.”32
Spinoza introduces something he calls God’s intellectual love for himself.  Admittedly, this sounds 
strange, and, as is to be expected, Bennett certainly does not endorse it.  When we consider God’s 
intellectual love for himself, we should look to the scholium to the corollary to VP36 for clarification.  
Here is one of the few places in the Ethics that Spinoza uses the word “blessedness” and Spinoza 
writes, “From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists, 
namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, or in God’s love for men.”
  Nietzsche would call them lame 
because Nietzsche disagrees with Spinoza’s moral and ethical conclusions; however, Bennett calls 
them lame because he does not appreciate what the third kind of knowledge delivers.   
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  Here is the connection to 
the moral doctrine toward which Spinoza has been working.  Virtue, striving to persevere and the 
third kind of knowledge all come together here in Spinoza’s account of a person’s highest 
satisfaction.  The third kind of knowledge is how we can understand that the formal essences of 
singular things are a part of the formal essence of the attribute under which they are conceived.  Thus, 
we know that the regularities that we see as the essence of the attributes that hold here and now are 
eternal ones, and that these are separate from the actual essences of singular things.  Moreover, this 




hold throughout our lifetime, and the virtue Spinoza’s system endorses really is effective ‘throughout’ 





Wolfson on Blessedness 
3.1 Wolfson on the Eternity of the Mind 
Wolfson interprets Spinoza’s statement that “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with 
the body, but something of it remains which is eternal”34 as an indication that Spinoza’s philosophical 
system posits not only the eternity of the mind, but the immortality of the mind as well.  “Immortality 
… means the eternal preservation of something that was peculiar to a particular human being during 
his lifetime.”35
Wolfson’s argument about the eternity of the mind undergoes at least two significant turns or shifts.  
Wolfson begins by arguing that Spinoza’s system does not permit the body to have an eternal 
existence, but does permit such an existence for a part of the mind.  Spinoza does say that part of the 
mind is eternal, and this is integral to his discussion of “blessedness,” both in my account and in 
  This chapter will demonstrate that the argument Wolfson presents to support this 
claim simply does not follow from Spinoza’s system.  This is important ground to cover because 
Wolfson’s claims about the eternity/immortality of the mind underpin his claims about “blessedness,” 
and refuting his claims about the immortality of the mind goes a long way to refuting his conclusions 
about “blessedness” as well.  Wolfson also connects the doctrines of the third kind of knowledge and 
the intellectual love of God to “blessedness.”  He argues that “blessedness” is a glimpse of 
immortality that humans can experience in this life; however, it is important to give a great deal of 
attention to Wolfson’s claims about the eternity of the mind because if he is correct about the eternity 
of the mind, then he is correct about “blessedness” as well. 
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Wolfson’s.  However, analyzing the way Wolfson treats the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and 
refutes the idea that the body has an eternal existence is fruitful for criticizing Wolfson’s account of 
“blessedness.”  The response to this section of Wolfson’s work will make use of passages from Part 2 
of the Ethics, and will demonstrate that Spinoza’s system actually precludes the possibility of a 
doctrine of personal immortality, and Section 1 will deal with this matter. 
In contrast to the first section, which discusses whether Spinoza’s system, as outlined in the second 
part, allows for a doctrine of personal immortality at all, Section 2 of this chapter will respond to 
Wolfson’s account that Spinoza openly argued for a doctrine of personal immortality in the fifth part 
of the Ethics.  Essentially, Wolfson tries to connect VP23, which states, “The human mind cannot be 
absolutely destroyed with the body but, something of it remains which is eternal” with the 
demonstration to VP38, which states, “the more the mind knows things by the second and third kind 
of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains.”  Wolfson suggests that Spinoza’s sentiment in 
VP38 echoes what Gersonides says in the following passage: “The individual differences of the 
immortal souls were explained as resulting from the differences in the nature and degree of the 
intellectual attainments of the individual persons during their lifetime.”36
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  Hence, it is from the 
connection between these two propositions that Wolfson draws the inference that the eternal existence 
a mind has as a part of God’s intellect constitutes a kind of personal immortality.  The Second section 
will explore this matter.  The two-step approach I employ here will show that Wolfson’s claims about 
the immortality of the soul are not only inconsistent with a superficial reading of Spinoza’s text, given 
that the scholium to VP41 rather explicitly states, “…the mind is not eternal, or immortal” but also 




3.2 Wolfson’s First Argument 
Wolfson begins this section, beginning on page 289, by discussing various ways theologians have 
thought about the immortality of the soul, and he divides these into two broad categories: “To those 
who consider the soul to be a self-subsisting spiritual substance which happens to exist for a certain 
tract of time in the body but is never a part of it, the soul in its entirety is said to be immortal.”37  
Wolfson agrees that Spinoza does not fall into the first category, but Wolfson would like to make the 
case that Spinoza does, in some way, fall into the second category of “those who consider the soul to 
be an inseparable form of the body, the soul as a whole is destroyed with body and only that part of it 
which becomes a self-subsisting substance, namely, the acquired intellect, remains immortal.”38  The 
idea of the existence of an acquired intellect in Spinoza’s system is really central to Wolfson’s 
analysis.  Wolfson then adds to this claim Spinoza’s proposition that all minds have an eternal part.39
Wolfson tries to show that Spinoza’s division between the imagination and the intellect parallels 
Maimonides’ division between the part of the soul that dies with the body and the part that gains 
eternal existence as the acquired intellect.  Wolfson’s first point is to say that in Spinoza’s system, 
“The mind is inseparable from the body; and consequently some of its functions, like imagination and 
memory, which are dependent upon sensation, must disappear with the disappearance of the body.”
  
40
The second point that supports Wolfson’s claim about the existence of an acquired intellect in 
Spinoza’s system is found in VP23, which states “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed 
  
Clearly, this follows from VP21, “The mind can neither imagine anything, nor recollect past things, 
except while the body endures.”   
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with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.”  Clearly, Wolfson does have some initial 
cause to suspect that Spinoza echoes Maimonides in this regard.  However, the question remains what 
the content of that eternal part of the mind is, whether it can gain eternal existence (as the acquired 
intellect does for Maimonides) and whether it is also immortal, in other words personal. 
It is important to note that Spinoza has a rather odd way of discussing the difference between the 
duration of the mind and the eternity of the mind.  Essentially, he writes that “we do not attribute to 
the human mind any duration that can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual 
existence of the body … we do not attribute duration to it except while the body endures.”41
3.2.1 The Acquired Intellect 
  Hence, 
Spinoza seems to think that the mind is always eternal except while the body endures, when it 
includes the imagination and is not completely eternal; however, more will be said about this in later 
Sections. 
As noted above, Wolfson would like to connect the notion of the eternal part of the mind, as Spinoza 
puts it “… in its [i.e. the mind’s] thinking essence it comes from above, like the acquired intellect 
from Maimonides; it is a mode of the eternal and infinite attribute of thought.”42
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  It is important to 
pause and note that Wolfson uses the term “from above” here not only to explain that the rational part 
of the mind comes from the attribute of thought but also that it returns to it later, which the following 
passage from Wolfson reinforces, “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, 
but something of it remains which is eternal (VP23).  That something is the thinking essence of the 




came.”43  In essence, Wolfson writes, “Both mind and body, Spinoza will admit, come from God, and 
unto God shall they return.”44
In discussing VP22, Wolfson makes a noteworthy error in discussing the body’s ‘ideal’ existence.  
VP22 states, “Nevertheless, in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or 
that human body, under a species of eternity.”  The interesting point Wolfson makes is that “…even 
after the body has actually ceased to exist, it still has ideal existence.”
  This is a problematic way to interpret Spinoza since he defines God as 
substance, and Wolfson’s interpretation would mean that there must first be some kind of separation 
between God and the substance wherein existence takes place for a return to happen later.  It will be 
shown below that Wolfson’s idea of a coming from God and a return to God are not appropriate 
descriptions for how the mind relates to the attribute of thought. 
45  Wolfson comes to this 
conclusion because “this idea or conception in God which expresses the essence of the human body is 
something which pertains to the essence of the human mind, for the human body is the object of the 
idea constituting the human mind.”46
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  Thus, one wonders how the idea or concept in God of the 
essence of a human body can have any existence as something resembling a human body at all, and 
more must be stated about what the essence of a human body is. 
First, consider IIA1, which states, “The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that 
is, from the order of Nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist or that he does not 





The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or 
substance does not constitute the form of man. 
Dem.  For the being of substance involves necessary existence.  
Therefore, if the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, 
then substance being given, man would necessarily be given, and 
consequently man would exist necessarily, which (by A1) is absurd. 
From the above quoted passages, we can read a very significant point of Spinoza’s philosophy.  
The first part of this point seems trivially true, which is that people actually do come to exist and 
cease to exist because of the order of Nature (i.e. a series of causes).  However, this also suggests a 
more subtle point that we must reconcile with VP22: IIP10 suggests that individual bodies do not 
have a guaranteed existence, and yet Spinoza writes in part V that bodies do exist as an idea of God 
under a species of eternity and that the mind cannot be entirely destroyed with the body. 
Arguably, any existence – even ideal existence – must take place in substance, and we must realize 
that Spinoza’s system guarantees the existence of the object of an idea.  If God has an idea of 
something then it must exist, because all ideas are adequate in God.  IIP10 states that substance does 
not constitute the form of man, yet obviously, some human beings do exist for a time, and the 
corollary to the proposition explains, “From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by 
certain modifications of God’s attributes.”47
During one of the lectures of an introductory physics course I attended, a student asked the 
professor how we could treat the mass of the earth as a constant “given all of the ‘living and dying’ 
that has taken place over all the years, which has surely added to the mass of the planet.”  The 
  Thus, a human body exists as a particular modification 
of the attribute of substance called extension; hence, we must explain human existence as a 
rearrangement of modes of substance.  I believe the following anecdote is an example of the idea 
Spinoza was trying to present here.   





professor responded by saying that eating food is the means by which humans –and all other living 
things as well – rearrange the world around them and incorporate it into their bodies.  When a living 
thing dies, its remains decompose into smaller parts and the mass of the earth remains constant. 
Arguably, the student began with the assumption that the being of substance does pertain to the 
essence of man (of living things in his words), and that these substances were somehow generated and 
accumulated over time to the point where they influenced the mass of the earth.  Spinoza’s position in 
IIP10 is clearly in accordance with the professor’s statement that living bodies are capable of 
rearranging the world around them into parts that are constitutive of their form, but that each form is 
not its own substance.  Thus, a body would be a mode of the attribute of extension, or a particular 
arrangement of substance, and this arrangement would only exist for a certain duration, but would not 
be a permanent feature of substance, which IIA1 suggests, or a substance on its own as IIP10 also 
demonstrates.  This is relevant to Wolfson’s account, for while he does not make the mistake of the 
introductory physics student, “For the death of the individual does not diminish the total amount of 
extension in the universe any more than it diminishes the total amount of thought.”48
3.3 On the Mind 
  However, this 
does begin to chart a course for how we can respond to Wolfson’s claims that the mind comes from 
God and returns to Him. 
This section will discuss the second part of the Ethics, especially focusing on connections between 
eternity, ideas and bodies, which Spinoza then makes use of in the fifth part.  The analysis contained 
in this section will demonstrate that Spinoza’s philosophical system does not support Wolfson’s 
comparison between Spinoza and Maimonides, i.e. between an eternal mind and an acquired intellect 
                                                   




that attains eternal existence; in addition, with Wolfson’s account disproved, this will pave the way 
for an alternative explanation not only of the eternity of the mind, but also of blessedness as well. 
Let us begin by considering IIP15, which states, “The idea that constitutes the formal being of the 
human mind is not simple but composed of a great many ideas.”  In the demonstration of that same 
proposition, Spinoza draws the connection between the “great many highly composite individuals” 
composing the human body and the ideas that correspond to those individual substances, which 
follows from his pan-psychism.  Then we should connect this to IID7, part of which states, “…if a 
number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I 
consider them, to that extent, as one singular thing.”  Thus, we can see that the body is made up of a 
number of smaller parts, each of which can exist on its own, but when they are together in the body, 
they constitute one singular thing.  In short, each body is made up of small parts, and the idea of the 
formal essence of the mind is nothing but a collection of the ideas of these small parts.  When the 
small parts come together to form a body and constitute a singular thing, then the mind can be said to 
have the body as an object, which follows from IIP13, which states, “The object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and 
nothing else.”  Moreover, this also follows from the scholium to IIP7, which states, “…a mode of 
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two different ways.”  
Since the mind is the idea of a body that exists, and its formal essence is a conglomeration of ideas 
corresponding to the small parts that make up the body, the mind (the idea of those smaller things in a 
particular arrangement) can only be the idea of the body when there is a body; otherwise, when the 
body does not exist, then the mind cannot exist either, and the idea of those smaller parts of the body 
must be ideas under the attribute of thought, in the infinite intellect of God.  Later on, in part five, 




mind that is eternal.  However, the following paragraph will demonstrate that the eternal part of the 
mind cannot contain or be the idea of anything personal. 
Since Wolfson would like to assert that eternity entails immortality, it is fruitful to consider what 
can happen to an idea when the singular thing (i.e. a human body) it is the idea of no longer exists as 
a singular thing.  For this reason, we should turn to IIP8, which states, “The ideas of singular things, 
or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the 
formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.”  At this point we 
might be tempted to side with Wolfson, and think that God does maintain an idea of this or that 
person in his infinite idea, even after they are dead.  However, consider the demonstration to IIP3, 
wherein Spinoza writes that “…God can think infinitely many things in infinitely many modes … but 
whatever is in God’s power necessarily exists.”  Now we can draw some connections together.  Since 
everything that God can think exists, we should no longer be tempted to side with Wolfson, given 
what has been stated above about the essence of man, namely, that man’s essence does not entail 
existence, according to IIP10.  Moreover, since the mind only exists while the body does, if the body 
does not exist then the mind does not exist either.  Since man’s essence does not guarantee existence, 
then the idea in God’s intellect of the essence of “this or that human body” cannot be an idea of the 
person while they were alive, or the person must exist whenever God held the idea of this or that 
person.  Thus, by the fact that God does have an idea of the essence of this or that person, and that 
essence does not entail existence, then we should think that a person’s essence cannot really be 
anything personal at all, and that no thoughts pertaining to the ‘person’ persist after his/her death. 
While I do want to focus on the second part of the Ethics in this section it is almost concluded, and 
there is an important connection that has not yet been made between the fifth and second parts that 




eternal existence.  The demonstration to VP23 states, “In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, 
which expresses the essence of the human body, an idea, therefore, which is necessarily something 
that pertains to the essence of the human mind…”  It is important to then see that the corollary to IIP8 
supports my argument, in that “…so long as singular things do not exist, except insofar as they are 
comprehended in God’s attributes, their objective being, or ideas, do not exist except insofar as God’s 
infinite idea exists.”  Hence, when a person dies, the idea in God of that person changes from an idea 
of the being as a whole to an idea that is a part of God’s infinite idea (or the attribute of thought).  In a 
way, then, the mind stops being the idea of a singular thing and is replaced by the ideas of each of the 
constituent parts, which always was the formal essence of the mind.  Hence, Spinoza’s system does 
permit an eternal existence to the attributes and to the formal essence of modes, but not to the modes 
themselves, in other words, human beings. 
3.4 Wolfson’s Second Argument 
As outlined above, Spinoza’s system does not allow for a mind, or an idea of a mind, to exist once the 
bodies that make up that mind no longer exist together as a singular thing; hence, since substance 
changed in such a way that the body no longer exists, then the idea of the finite modes (or singular 
things) should no longer exist.  However, the infinite idea of the formal essence of substance should 
still exist.  In other words, the ideas of the constituent parts of the body should still exist, but the idea 
of the body should disappear.   
Wolfson goes on to make the claim that the fifth part of the Ethics can be interpreted in such a way 
that all minds have an eternal part, but that this eternal part is personal; essentially, Wolfson wants to 
connect the activities of a living person with what the properties that the eternal mind will have.  This 




asserts that a mind can have a greater or lesser part that is eternal, and a greater or lesser part that 
perishes with the body.  On its face, Wolfson’s proposal that “… there exist certain differences 
between the individual souls which remain after death”49
I question Wolfson’s approach because if something (i.e. the mind) is eternal, then it should not be 
able to change once it is embodied in a singular thing.  In short, the eternal thing that ‘comes out of’ 
the body after death should be the same as the eternal thing that ‘went into’ the body before it existed.  
While Wolfson considers the following point “…it is against Plato that [Spinoza] argues that “it is 
impossible that we should recollect that we existed before the body,”
 is not easily dismissed unless one considers 
the consequences of Spinoza’s system, as discussed above.  Wolfson’s view would have it that the 
mind acquired eternal truths, and that these truths distinguish this mind from that within God’s 
intellect.  However, then it would mean that God had an idea of a disembodied mind that contained 
ideas of eternal truths.  Because of Spinoza’s parallelism, an idea in the intellect of God would have 
to have a corresponding part of substance that could be understood under the attribute of extension, 
which would mean that the idea in question would have to be an idea of something.  Thus, if it were 
true that the eternal part of the mind did acquire knowledge, then God would actually have an idea of 
a dead person doing this or that, which would seem to be necessary for Wolfson’s account to hold, 
and there must be a person actually doing this or that.  However, human essence does not involve 
existence, and there would actually be an afterlife in Spinoza’s system after all, so this would be 
absurd.   
50
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 this simply does not address 
the fact that there is evidence in Spinoza’s text to show that what he conceives of the mind as eternal 




from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, 
through the same attribute eternal and infinite.”  Since thought is an attribute, we should think that 
IP21 applies to the attribute of thought; moreover, since the intellect is part of God’s infinite intellect, 
we should think that the intellect is immutable. 
However problematic Wolfson’s ‘acquisitive’ view of the eternal part of the mind may be, he holds 
to it, and writes that the cause of the differences between the souls after death “…is to be found in the 
difference between men in the acquisitions of conceptions both qualitatively and quantitatively.”51  
Wolfson then adds to this the claim that “…the unity which these conceptions form in his acquired 
intellect after death will differ from the unity formed in the acquired intellect of another person who 
has acquired fewer conceptions of the same science.”52
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  In this way, we can see that Wolfson’s 
account is inconsistent with the framework Spinoza has outlined in the second part for several 
reasons.  Wolfson is simply unable to prove that Spinoza’s system allows for the eternal part of the 
mind to retain any knowledge, or concepts as he calls them; instead, Wolfson should recognize that 
Spinoza’s account of the eternity of the mind leads one to think that the eternal part of the mind is the 
part that allows the mind (which is stuck with a body of some duration) to understand the eternal 
essences of the attributes, and that Spinoza’s references in Part V to minds with greater or lesser 
eternal parts does not imply that the eternal part grows.  Indeed, it seems much more likely that the 
imagination shrinks, because the mind, i.e. the idea of the singular thing, holds fewer inadequate ideas 
when it holds more adequate ideas.  Put another way, if a mind had fewer passions, it would have 
fewer confused ideas and the part of the mind that held inadequate ideas would then be smaller than 




3.4.1 The Infinite Intellect 
In this section, I will argue that the fifth part of the Ethics simply does not support Wolfson’s account 
of an infinite intellect as the eternal part of the mind.  The above sections have shown that if the body 
does not exist, then the ideas associated with the parts of the body must disperse and become different 
finite modes of the attribute of thought as the parts become different finite modes of the attribute of 
extension.  This section will discuss how the intellect and the imagination pertain to the mind in an 
effort to argue against Wolfson’s conclusions that the mind’s activity of forming adequate ideas and 
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge leads to a unique eternal part, which attains 
immortality.  In this section, I will argue that Spinoza has to say that some part of the mind is eternal; 
otherwise, he would be hard-pressed to explain how it is that beings whose existence necessarily 
involves duration can understand the eternal regularities we observe using reason and science.   
Wolfson’s view of the acquired intellect must be opposed by the view that the eternal part of the 
mind simply recognizes, or is influenced by what is already there.  Consider, Spinoza’s claim that 
It is clear that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode 
of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of 
thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of 
thinking…and so on to infinity; so that together, they all constitute 
God’s eternal and infinite intellect.53
Spinoza treats the eternal part of the mind and the mind that can only conceive of duration in a 
similar way, in that both are aspects of the modes of the attribute of thought, and these two aspects 
both correspond to some part of substance, and that each follows from previous states of substance.  
Otherwise, the eternal truths would not hold because one eternal mode of thinking would not then 
have consequences for the following mode in the very same way that one object bumping into another 





what is conceived, with a certain eternal necessity, through God’s essence itself is nevertheless 
something, this something that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal.”54
3.5 Wolfson on the Third Kind of Knowledge 
  
Hence, Spinoza thinks that the things that are conceived of under a species of eternity really are 
things.  Thus, the ideas of these eternal things determine the eternal part of our mode of God’s infinite 
intellect, but Spinoza’s system does not support the view that they adhere to the eternal part in the 
acquisitive way Wolfson sets out from Spinoza’s system.  These eternal modes should be just like the 
modes of singular things, which we encounter and which determine us to action, but which we do not 
then make a part of us, or acquire.  One eternal mode simply causes a change in state in another mode 
that parallels the regularities that are visible in extended substance.   
Wolfson’s argument regarding blessedness is, essentially, that each bit of information that the soul 
acquires by the third kind of knowledge becomes a part of the intellect that attains eternal (in other 
words, immortal) existence.  While the previous section argued that Spinoza’s system simply does not 
support this interpretation, this section will show that Wolfson’s interpretation of what can be known 
by the third kind of knowledge is also not consistent with Spinoza’s system.  Since the third kind of 
knowledge is critical to Spinoza’s account of blessedness, highlighting Wolfson’s inconsistencies 
with Spinoza’s account further bolsters the case that his interpretation of blessedness is flawed.   
It is clear that Spinoza holds that God is substance, but the eternal properties of substance are the 
essence of God, for Spinoza.  So, it is somewhat strange to find Wolfson making the claim that 
“…Spinoza believes that we have a direct, intuitive knowledge of the existence of God.”55
                                                                                                                                                             
53 VP40Schol. 
54 VP23Dem. 
55 Wolfson 298 




would have been more appropriate for Wolfson to introduce the matter by saying that we understand 
the essence of God.  Wolfson wants to distinguish between the knowledge that we gain from 
individual things and the knowledge of the third kind, “This peace of mind, which the third kind of 
knowledge brings to us during our lifetime, Spinoza seems to say, is a foretaste of the eternal 
blessedness which awaits us after death.”56
3.5.1 Wolfson’s Account 
 
I agree almost entirely with Wolfson’s interpretation of the third kind of knowledge.  Wolfson 
concludes, “This knowledge of God and of one’s being in God and of one’s being conceived through 
God is the subject matter of the third kind of knowledge.”57  Wolfson writes, “Previously, (VP24) he 
has stated that the understanding of individual things will be helpful toward the attainment of the third 
kind of knowledge.”58  This is the important beginning point for understanding the third kind of 
knowledge, and Wolfson is correct to point it out.  He makes no mistake by then saying that “it is 
only when we have adequate ideas of individual things, as when we know their common properties or 
when we know them in their mutual relations, that we understand them, and it is only such an 
understanding that will lead to the highest kind of knowledge.”59
Consider IIP26, which states, “The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually 
existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.”  Spinoza goes on, in IIP25, to 
state “The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an 
  He is correct to say that we must 
know singular things adequately by their mutual relations and common properties, particularly by 
being aware of what is equally in the part (or mode) and in the whole of substance.   
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external body.”  Thus, if the mind only knows external bodies by the affection of the body, and any 
affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body, then the mind 
can only have inadequate ideas of external bodies; in addition, IIP27 through 31 further state 
circumstances of inadequate knowledge, which all have to do with the body’s affections. However, 
this is not the only way the mind can know external bodies, and the mind can form adequate ideas.  
The following paragraph shows how Wolfson correctly identifies Spinoza’s system that explains 
adequate knowledge. 
Indeed, Wolfson correctly identifies passages from Spinoza’s text that show “…it is the nature of 
the mind in its second kind of knowledge, or, as it is called by Spinoza, reason, to see things under the 
form of eternity.”60  Wolfson then makes the connection that the mind can only know external things 
by virtue of the body.  “Consequently, if the mind knows external things under the form of eternity, it 
must know them only through knowledge of its own body under the form of eternity…and so also, of 
course, must the mind know itself under the form of eternity.”61
It is important to note the connections Spinoza makes between adequate knowledge and essences, 
which is shown in his discussion on reason and intuition.  Reason depends on those things “…which 
are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, [which] can only be conceived 
adequately.”
   
62  In the corollary to this proposition, Spinoza introduces the term ‘common notions,’ 
“for (by L2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by IIP38) must be conceived adequately, or 
clearly and distinctly.”63
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  Thus, these are things that are common to all bodies.  However, the essence 
of a thing does not consist merely in what is equally in the part and in the whole, and this is evident 




The final part of Wolfson’s account of the third kind of knowledge is his correct statement that 
“from the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible satisfaction of the mind … [i.e.] 
the intellectual love of God.”64
3.5.2 Against Final Causes, and What Wolfson Missed 
  Wolfson’s evaluation of the intellectual love of God will be treated in 
the next short section following this one. 
I must say that I agree with all of what Wolfson has said, and the problematic parts of his account 
happen in his analysis of the eternity of the mind, where he misjudges whether Spinoza’s system is 
capable of supporting an acquisitive eternal part of the mind.  However much I agree with what 
Wolfson has said about the third kind of knowledge, I must say that Wolfson has missed something 
important as well by locating human kind’s highest good, or “blessedness,” in the afterlife. 
Spinoza works so hard in his text to show that nature does not act toward an end of any sort.  In the 
appendix to Part one, Spinoza tries to address the prejudices of men, identifying the origins of the 
ideas that attribute a will to God; indeed, he appeals to mathematics, “which is concerned not with 
ends, but only with the essences and properties of figures [, which] shows men another standard of 
truth.”65
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  Along with not attributing a will to God, arguably, Spinoza also does not attribute a will to 
human kind, for the reason that the ideas this or that person has, at any given time, exist because of 
previous causes, in the very same way as the particular arrangement of substance at any given time 
follows from previous causes.  Indeed, IP17 rather explicitly states, “God acts from the laws of his 
nature alone, and is compelled by no one.”  However interesting this might be, I mention it only to 




and because the discussion of properties and the essence of man and of God are central to 
understanding the third kind of knowledge, and in the following section I would like to argue that 
Wolfson’s account of the third kind of knowledge is incomplete, and misses Spinoza’s goal of 
endorsing reason as the best way for man to persevere in this life. 
Aside from his mistake to call it acquisitive, Wolfson’s account of the third kind of knowledge 
comes very close to the one I would like to use to support my argument about “blessedness.”  It is 
evident that Wolfson locates human kind’s highest quality of life in the afterlife, and that is why he 
does not make the step I will here.  Wolfson comes so close when he writes, “the third kind of 
knowledge is the object of the conscious effort and desire of the mind during its existence in the 
human body.”66
Quite correctly, Wolfson explains that the mind can only adequately understand things under a 
species of eternity, and that in so doing, the mind is aware of its own eternal nature.  However, 
Wolfson and I differ on what that knowledge then leads one to believe about one’s afterlife.  For 
Wolfson, the mind’s knowledge of its own eternity is the foretaste of the “blessedness” of the 
afterlife.  For me, the mind’s awareness of its own eternity means it can understand cause and effect; 
indeed, God acts from his own perfection, and this action is not teleological.  Hence, the mind is able 
to apprehend the eternal properties of substance, like those found through science.  If we consider that 
the mind might only consist of a part that can only think of things and essences existing for some 
  For Wolfson, that desire leads to making intuitive connections that will enlarge the 
eternal part of the mind, and guarantee immortality; whereas, I interpret this topic as Spinoza’s 
endorsement of a sound conception of cause and effect, with which one can increase one’s ability to 
persevere in this life rather than in the afterlife. 
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duration of time, then it would be difficult to be able to understand that the regularities that appear 
actually reflect the eternal properties of substance.  Hence, Spinoza’s account of the eternity of the 
mind and the third kind of knowledge is an attempt to account for the mind’s ability to perceive 
certain things as eternal regularities, rather than as a ‘whim’ of God, who, if his attributes were not 
eternal and perfect, might not act the same way again in the future. 
According to IVD8, the essence of man is virtue, insofar as we consider the things that a person can 
bring about by his/her nature alone.  This is an important point, because it allows us to take Wolfson’s 
argument in a different direction.  Consider the scholium to IIP45, which states, “…still the force by 
which each one [i.e. singular things] perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of 
God’s nature.”  To this, we can connect the following proposition, which states, “The human mind 
has adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence.”  Thus, we should connect the claim in 
IVD8 that the essence of a person is virtue (insofar as we consider what that person can bring about 
by his/her nature alone) to the claim that the mind has adequate knowledge of the essence of God.  
Discussing the importance of bringing things about through actions rather than passions is a part of 
the analysis of the intellectual love of God; however, it is important to note here that it is by 
understanding the immutable rather mutable nature of these essences that allows one to increase one’s 
ability to persevere.   
3.6 The Intellectual Love of God 
We can see a conceit in Wolfson’s interpretation of the intellectual love of God when he writes, “It is 
the accurate and true knowledge attained only by philosophers of the absolute essence of God.”67
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know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of the first importance morality … and 
absolutely all the things we have shown to be related to tenacity and nobility.”68
 Spinoza writes in IIIP6 and IIIP7 that all things strive to persevere in their being, and that this 
striving is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.  This is helpful for understanding the third kind 
of knowledge, because we can now connect Spinoza’s statement in IVD8, “that is (by IIIP7), virtue, 
insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of 
bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.”  The 
striving that is evidently the essence of man is best achieved, Spinoza reckons, through virtue.  
However, we should now also note that virtue goes by the name of the intellectual love of God as 
  Hence, it would 
seem that one does not have to be a philosopher in order to realize that morality, and virtue in 
particular, are of the utmost importance, and Spinoza calls these the intellectual love of God.   
 As was the case in the section concerning the third kind of knowledge, Wolfson presents an 
interpretation that the intellectual love of God follows from Spinoza’s endorsement of blessedness as 
a kind of personal immortality.  Wolfson does not amend his earlier claim that the eternal part of the 
mind gains things by the third kind of knowledge by considering the scholium to VP33, which states, 
“…the mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our fiction, now come to it…”  Indeed, 
Wolfson had not anticipated the criticism raised earlier that the eternal mind should be immutable, 
and therefore not able to acquire new knowledge, even by intuition.  He does not deal with this 
problem at all, nor does he deal with what is now a new problem for his account, which states that the 
mind almost ‘recalls’ the eternal things.  Arguably, if Wolfson were right, and the mind did gather 
ideas together by the third kind of knowledge, then surely the differences between the souls in the 
afterlife should vanish at some point, since Spinoza thinks that the mind is endowed with perfection.   





well.  Since blessedness is the enjoyment of virtue (or the love of God), we should note that 
blessedness is the enjoyment of our striving to persevere in our being, all of which is clearly 
connected in the scholium to the final proposition. 
Since it has been shown that Spinoza’s system simply does not support Wolfson’s attempt to argue 
that the object of an individual’s pursuits should be his/her immortal nature, we should note that 
virtue, or the love of God is about actual beings in existence striving to persevere in their being.  The 
intellectual love of God is in complete accord with an interpretation of blessedness that treats actual 
increases in one’s power to persevere as an individual person’s highest good.  The reason that this is 
not a selfish thing is because Spinoza thinks that our perseverance is aided by our fellow man, and 
that by helping others, we help ourselves by making a better world wherein it is easier to persevere.   
The following chapter will present an account of blessedness that treats a person’s satisfaction not 
as a kind of immortality, but as his/her enjoyment of his/her own virtue.  The account of blessedness 
that remains is one in which a person can only ever achieve moments of blessedness, but those details 





The Episodic Nature of Blessedness in Spinoza’s Ethics 
In this section, I will discuss Spinoza’s conception of blessedness, as Spinoza outlines in the final 
proposition of the Ethics.  Wolfson’s interpretation of blessedness as Spinoza’s doctrine of personal 
immortality does not follow from Spinoza’s philosophical system, nor does Bennett’s interpretation 
of Spinoza’s doctrine of blessedness as unintelligible rubbish follow either.  I would like to present 
the following as an interpretation of blessedness that is both consistent with Spinoza’s philosophical 
system and is also quite intelligible.  Moreover, it is entirely consistent with Spinoza’s hints earlier in 
the text that the true happiness for human beings is found in a good life here and now, and that our 
understanding of the eternal nature and properties of substance gives us the means to achieve that life.  
My account is motivated by Spinoza’s discussion of blessedness in IIP48Schol.IV, which I shall 
quote in full: 
Our greatest happiness or, blessedness consists in the knowledge of 
God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love 
and morality advise.  From this, we clearly understand how far they 
stray from the true valuation of virtue, who expect to be honoured by 
God with the greatest rewards for their virtue and best actions, as for 
the greatest bondage – as if virtue itself and the service of God were 
not happiness itself, and the greatest freedom.69
Blessedness is different from joy, which is comparatively easy to arrive at.  According to the 
general definition of the affects, “Joy is a man’s passage from a lesser perfection to a greater 
perfection” and sadness is the opposite; in addition, “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but 
virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we 
 





are able to restrain them.”70
I will demonstrate that having an inadequate idea entails a loss of power, and that having 
inadequate ideas is an inevitable part of our life, in that it is inevitable that we will be acted on in the 
future, and therefore suffer passions; consider that Spinoza writes, “It is impossible that a man should 
undergo no other changes except those of which he himself is the adequate cause.”
  Hence, the interpretation I offer here is that the enjoyment of virtue is a 
blessing since it is how we are best able to fulfill our nature, which is to strive to persevere; 
alternatively, we could think of blessedness as freedom from the affects that reduce our ability to 
strive.  In a later section, I will use the details of Spinoza’s account to show why one’s strong desire 
for virtue is the only means for overcoming one’s passions.  It is important to note that Spinoza uses 
the word virtue because “by virtue and power I understand the same thing” (IVD8).  Thus, 
blessedness is the enjoyment of power, which is an expression of our ability to persevere in being.  I 
will show that Spinoza conceives of blessedness as the satisfaction with our own power.  Since I do 
not believe that one can be satisfied with one’s power unless one actually has it, I do not think that 
Spinoza’s account of blessedness works if one has no power, or even if one experiences a loss in 
power.  
71
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  Thus, I will 
demonstrate that even if one is blessed, the experience will not last indefinitely.  I will also show that 
Spinoza anticipates this, and this does not undermine the idea of blessedness at all.  In the last few 
sections, I will show how one’s ideas are related to God, in other words, I will show how Spinoza 
demonstrates that an adequate idea ‘works’ in relation to an inadequate one, by discussing the third 




The first part of this Chapter will be concerned with showing why blessedness must be episodic, 
while the second part will specifically show, by carefully looking at the third kind of knowledge, 
what happens when one has an adequate idea vs. an inadequate one.  This will be an effort to explain 
the matter of the intellectual love of God that Spinoza outlines in the fifth book, and especially in the 
demonstration to VP42.  
4.1 On Virtue and Power 
I have already discussed the connection between virtue and power Spinoza makes.  It is particularly 
evident in IVD8, which we can connect to IIIP7.  Indeed, Spinoza stipulates that virtue is the essence 
of man insofar as he brings things about that can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.  
Thus, virtues are nothing but our striving when it is motivated by our natural striving alone rather 
than by external causes, or passions.  Hence, virtues come from adequate ideas72
                                                   
  
 because they can be 
understood internally – and are not ever motivated by inadequate ideas, or passions, thus, in a way, 
virtue is like tenacity, “For by tenacity I understand the desire by which one strives, solely from the 
dictate of reason, to preserve his being” (IIIP59). 
Perhaps we could think of virtue as striving from adequate ideas, and that is more powerful than 
striving from confused ideas because it means that one acts in ways that depend on contingencies, but 
I will explain adequate ideas thoroughly in the last sections.   Nevertheless, blessedness, which is the 
enjoyment of virtue, is the enjoyment of power, and I will now show why Spinoza’s system includes 
a fluid loss and gain of power over time that would make blessedness the type of state that can only 




In this section I would like to focus on two propositions that are, I think, key to understanding why 
blessedness must be episodic.  These two propositions will show that the mind strives to have 
adequate ideas, and gain power, but it will also show that if the mind is met with a more powerful 
inadequate idea, then it will lose power.  IID3 makes a significant claim, “By affect I understand 
affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or 
restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.”  Thus, whenever there is an affect of 
the body there is also an idea of that affect in the mind.  Hence, this section shows that if the body is 
exposed to events that reduce its power of acting, then the mind’s power will also be reduced because 
an idea of the affect is always present in the mind.  “The idea of any thing that increases or 
diminishes, aids or restrains, our body’s power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, 
our mind’s power of thinking.”73
Here it would perhaps be useful to discuss briefly what the mind’s power is.  From the scholium to 
VP4, “the mind has no other power than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas.”  Just to clarify, 
we can see that the mind’s only power is that of forming adequate ideas, that it can be aided or 
restrained in this by the affections of the body, and that whenever the body has an affection, the mind 
is affected as well.  Thus, the mind loses its only power, i.e. its ability to form adequate ideas, 
whenever it is acted on; more importantly, each and every human being is also affected in the mind 
whenever the body is affected by something external.  Spinoza writes, “We are acted on, insofar as 
we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived through itself, without the others.”
 Hence, the interrelatedness of the mind and body seems to lead to 
the consequence that the mind’s power of thinking is restrained whenever the body is affected by 
something that restrains its power of action. 
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inevitable that a human being will be affected by external things in order to show that the mind does 
not ever exist in such a state where it is beyond passions indefinitely.   
A part of Spinoza’s philosophical system posits that everything is a part of nature, and that nothing 
exists outside of nature.  Thus, there are no people who are not a part of nature.  Thus, we are all 
acted on, and this is reinforced by IVP3, and IVP4, quoted above, “The force by which a man 
perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.”75
4.2 Tips on Intellectual Housekeeping from Part Five 
  This 
proposition states that regardless of how much one tries, one will not be able to persevere forever 
against the external causes, which is an inevitable consequence of our being a part of nature.  Since it 
is inevitable that one will experience inadequate ideas, then one’s virtue (or power) is reduced; thus, 
one’s ability to enjoy that power is reduced as well.  Hence, if one ever experienced blessedness, one 
could not count oneself blessed when one meets any of the external causes that ‘push’ one out of 
blessedness again.  In other words, if one did love one’s own virtue and enjoyed virtue for its own 
sake, then, as a part of nature, it is inevitable that one will encounter (at least for a short time) some 
external cause that reduces one’s love for virtue with a stronger desire brought about by the 
imagination.  One can always lose a loved one to violence, disease or through accidents, which are all 
brought about through nature.  However, these types of moments would always jar someone out of 
blessedness, and it is for this reason that Spinoza includes the first fifteen propositions of the fifth 
part. 
It is this idea of being surpassed by the external causes that I wish to call attention to.  External causes 
always cause passions, and the fifth book of the Ethics teaches a sort of proactive plan one can take to 





remove the passions more quickly, and not be acted on by them for quite as long.  We should 
especially consider Spinoza’s sentiment in VP11, where he makes the simple point that the more 
often an image or affect occurs, the more often it engages the mind.  Perhaps this book could be read 
in such a way that shows that Spinoza considers blessedness to be a state that is permanent, or fixed; 
in that, that the more often one experiences joy, the more the affect will flourish.  However, as I have 
shown above, there is enough evidence to suggest that our nature as beings who inevitably suffer 
external causes of some sort makes only some kind of transfigured state the one where blessedness 
lasted forever.  However, this would be inconsistent with Spinoza’s work as he regards reality as 
perfect and refutes the idea of a dominion within a dominion.  Rather, while Spinoza does not say this 
explicitly, I will now continue to argue that it is, to some extent, implied that the state of blessedness 
can only ever be episodic. 
While I do wish to focus on the fifth book in this section of the work, I will begin with IVP6, which 
states, “The force of any passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that 
the affect stubbornly clings to the man.”76
It is important to note that, from IVP3, we are always vulnerable to external causes that are more 
powerful than we are, and that can prevent us from striving successfully.  However, the 
disentanglement of passions from their causes is introduced in VP3, which states, “An affect which is 
a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it,” and, from VP4, 
“There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept.”  Thus, each 
  I find this to be a key section, and one that the first 
propositions of the fifth book specifically address through their emphasis on the use of the mind’s 
power to form adequate ideas of the things that are currently passions.   





passion we are affected by affects us and diminishes our power.  It affects the body and the mind 
together and it does diminish the power of action in the mind and in the body.   
In order to overcome the mind’s loss in power the mind could ‘recall the things that aid its power’ 
and exercise its ability to form clear and distinct ideas on any passion.  Moreover, by VP6, “Insofar as 
the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, or is less acted on 
by them.”  Thus, Spinoza starts giving an account of ‘tricks’ the mind can use to increase its power 
over the power of the affect.  Hence, Spinoza teaches the reader a way of purging the mind of the 
ideas of the passions. 
In order to strive well, Spinoza provides reasons for joining with other human beings and aiding 
one another in the common task of perseverance.  “By nobility I understand the desire by which each 
one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship.”77 
Surely, this is the kind of ‘ready knowledge’ that Spinoza encourages his readers to have at hand in 
VP10Schol., “To put aside fear, we must think in the same way of tenacity: that is, we must recount 
and frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can be best avoided and overcome 
by presence of mind and strength of character,”78
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 and most of these tasks are made easier by joining 
with our fellow man.  If we now look back at VP42, we can apply what I have covered in these two 
sections.  First, if “blessedness is virtue itself” and by virtue we can also understand power, insofar as 
it is our tenacious striving from the dictates of reason, then I think that I have shown how power, and 
therefore blessedness, can be lost due to the inevitability of external causes.  Thus, whenever we lose 
power, we lose the state of blessedness if we ever had it.  However, if a person has lost power (which 




mentally regain his/her power by acting from reason rather than a passion.  Nevertheless, being that 
we are always contingent creatures, and that we will always be acted on, we can only ever try to 
persevere and we will ultimately fail. 
4.3 Love of Virtue and the Intellectual Love of God 
I have shown in the sections above that Spinoza’s conception of power is fluid, i.e., that power can 
come and go, and that blessedness can (possibly) come and (surely) will go.  Since it is our nature to 
suffer inadequate ideas from external causes, then if our someone ever has a moment of being truly 
blessed, one where she rejoices in her virtue and truly suffers no externally caused ideas, she will do 
so only until her nature as a thing subject to external causes catches up with her.  That is not to say 
that she could not then overcome the new idea, but she will not be blessed again until she does so.  As 
I have outlined above, existential ‘quality of life’ matters in Spinoza’s account at least as much as the 
intellectual or mental side does.  For the remainder of this paper I would like to focus only on the 
intellectual side of blessedness, and presume that our Spinozist is not in any danger, at the moment, of 
‘losing’ blessedness due to an external cause, like an illness or some other threat.  I know that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the mind separately from the body and I do not mean to.  
However, in this section, I only want to look at the purely intellectual love of virtue, and how that 
pertains to Spinoza’s definition of blessedness. 
Let us focus briefly on one short section of Spinoza’s demonstration of VP42. 
…because the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, it has the 
power of restraining lusts.  And because human power to restrain the 
affects consists only in the intellect, no one enjoys blessedness 
because he has restrained the affects.  Instead, the power to restrain 





As I have stated previously, Spinoza’s account of blessedness is an account of enjoying virtue.  It is 
clear that the power to restrain affects is found solely in the intellect, for our ability to “…bring about 
the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest of the human body’s parts have to one 
another…” is a bodily kind of power, and is different from the one that can restrain the passions 
(IVP39).  That is just to say that thinking adequate ideas will not cure hunger, and having all the food 
you might ever need to survive will not prevent passions.  Our physical preservation can come from 
inadequate causes, by definition, it would not be virtuous, but it could work.  Given these distinctions, 
blessedness is something that requires the preservation of the normal proportion of motion and rest of 
the body’s parts as a pre-condition; afterwards, the power of the mind can begin to dismantle the 
affects that “stubbornly cling” to man, and those that arise in the future, as was discussed in the 
‘housekeeping’ section.   I will return to the matter of how the mind achieves blessedness by loving 
virtue, but first wish to engage in a brief, but perhaps fruitful, digression. 
In the fourth book, Spinoza presents an account of one affect being overcome by another, stronger 
one.  In the fifth book, Spinoza presents an account of reason divorcing affects from their external 
causes, and thereby forming a clear and distinct idea of them, which eliminates the passion.  While 
this does seem like two different accounts, if we look at VP6 again, we can see that he actually 
presents an argument that the activity of creating adequate ideas gives one a ‘reason’ (in the sense of 
a justification) for wanting virtue more than a passion, and thus be able to overcome passions in the 
same manner as the fourth book.  “Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a 
greater power over the affects, or is less acted on by them.”79
As was outlined in book five, and was quoted above, the intellectual activity of understanding the 





virtues.  Perhaps this is mostly because acting virtuously is the most likely way to get the efficient 
causes to align in such a way that makes striving easier.  Thus, the more adequate ideas the mind has, 
the more it should want virtues, rather than (and I do not know if anyone actually holds this view or 
not) the view that reason is something divorced from affects.  Thus, we can look at some relevant 
passages from the fourth part, 
No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil 
insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect80
…no affect [, and passions are affects,] can be restrained except by 
an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained…
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In this way, all the appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar as 
they arise from inadequate ideas, and are counted as virtues when 
they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas.
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We can see that for Spinoza each inadequately caused affect must be restrained by a stronger, 
adequately caused affect, and that once an affect comes from an adequate idea, it is called a virtue.  
Hence, this gives us further cause to reject Bennett’s assertion that the fifth book makes no sense 
given the other four.  We should confidently take Spinoza literally when he writes that one has the 
power to restrain lusts because one enjoys blessedness (which is virtue by another name), that is, we 





I have treated the love of God, the eternity of the mind and the third kind of knowledge in the 
preceding chapters concerning Wolfson and Bennett, and I have delivered positive interpretations of 
each in those sections.  While it is tempting to repeat the relevant sections here, perhaps it is enough 
only to discuss a few connections to virtue. 
According to Spinoza’s system outlined in Part Two, the third kind of knowledge is useful because 
it gives one adequate knowledge of the essence of the attributes, which one can then use to improve 
one’s striving.  One can then use this information to predict those dangers that one can anticipate 
along with ways to avoid them, as Spinoza suggests.  The adequate knowledge of the attributes is 
useful because then one can “consider human actions and appetites as if it were a question of lines, 
planes and bodies.”83
This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate 
no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at no one, 
to envy no one; and also insofar as it teaches that each of us should 
be content with his own things, and should be helpful to his 
neighbor, not from unmanly compassion, partiality or superstition, 
but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand.
  In other words, one can anticipate the consequences one’s actions will have on 
others and one can thereby overcome dangers with thoughtful preparation and actions that will aid in 
one’s nobility and by avoiding things that might be an obstacle to striving.  Spinoza actually takes a 
rather hard line on this, and if we recall his definition of nobility, we can understand how high the 
standard Spinoza’s lays out for cooperation with the rest of humanity is, and he foreshadows it at the 
end of the Second Part, 
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We might disagree with Spinoza on whether or not it matters that we disesteem or mock anyone.  
However, he might argue that this would restrict or diminish our nobility and reduce the extent to 
which we can make use of the benefits of others in our striving, or our virtue, especially when we 
consider that our goal is long-term cooperation with others. 
All things that have been said about virtue can also be said about the love of God, for it is virtue 
itself according to the demonstration of VP42.  Throughout this work, I have endeavoured to argue 
that blessedness is episodic and why it must be so, for it is inevitable that one will be acted on by 
external causes, and that this necessarily leads to a loss in power, which must be a loss in virtue, the 
enjoyment of which Spinoza calls blessedness.  One cannot enjoy a thing one does not have, so it 
seems likely to me that one cannot be blessed if one loses power since a loss of power is inevitable 
because inadequate ideas are inevitable, and because all men and women are a part of nature.  
Moreover, I hope that this work showed how Spinoza’s use of ‘eternity of the mind’ and ‘God’s 
intellectual love for himself’ are compatible with his earlier accounts of virtue. 
In this thesis, I have argued that Bennett’s claims that blessedness is inconsistent with the rest of 
Spinoza’s Ethics are unfounded and that Wolfson’s claims that Spinoza had a doctrine of personal 
immortality in mind are not supported by Spinoza’s system; in addition, I have presented my own 
positive account of blessedness that is both consistent with Spinoza’s system and with his rejection of 
doctrines of personal immortality as well.  I would like to say that I find it sad that blessedness does 
not receive more attention in Spinoza scholarship, particularly because this is one aspect of his work 
that gives us a guide for how to read the Ethics, which the geometric method makes so fragmentary 
an experience.  Indeed, Spinoza’s clear statements that he feels that blessedness is a person’s highest 
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